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NO. 32 JUNE 2020 Introduction 
The International Dimensions of 
Germany’s Hydrogen Policy 
Kirsten Westphal, Susanne Dröge and Oliver Geden 
Hydrogen is a highly versatile source of energy that has attracted growing interest 
among policymakers and industry players within the context of energy and climate 
policy. By drawing up its own strategy, the German government wants to promote the 
future use of this energy carrier in various sectors of the economy. However, a German 
hydrogen strategy cannot be drawn up independently from what is happening at the 
EU level and in other member states; rather, it must be conceived as an integral part 
of a Europe-wide policy. Since Germany currently imports more than 70 per cent of its 
primary energy sources, the market roll-out of hydrogen will inevitably have interna-
tional dimensions. Therefore, it is important that this policy be anchored accordingly. 
In order to gradually create a market for hydrogen, the EU and Germany should push 
ahead with forming bilateral partnerships and developing multilateral governance. 
 
Already in the months before the outbreak 
of the coronavirus crisis, hydrogen (H2) has 
been seen more or less as the silver bullet 
with which national climate and energy tar-
gets could be met. Since then, the idea of a 
hydrogen-based energy future has emerged 
as a focal area for energy and industrial 
policies. Accordingly, H2 was included in 
the German stimulus package of June 2020 
as a key element to reboost and restructure 
Germany’s economy. The National Hydro-
gen Strategy adopted on 10 June 2020 puts 
an emphasis on green hydrogen, promotes 
its rapid market rollout and the establish-
ment of the necessary value chains. It con-
tains plans to build industrial-scale hydro-
gen demonstration and production plants 
with a total capacity of up to 5 Gigawatts 
(GW) by 2030, which corresponds to 14 
terawatt-hours (TWh) of green hydrogen 
production and will require 20 TWh of 
(additional) renewables-based electricity. 
Seven billion Euros have been earmarked 
for the development of a hydrogen value 
chain in all industrial sectors, as well as 
heating and transport. Furthermore, the 
strategy expresses the belief that “both a 
global and European hydrogen market will 
emerge in the coming ten years and that 
carbon-free (for example blue or turquoise) 
hydrogen will be traded on this market.” 
Amid sky-high expectations, there is the 
risk of a hard landing. Those expectations 
are founded on H2 being deployable in 
a number of sectors and having a diverse 
value chain. The stages of this value chain, 
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which can be interlocked at the political, 
economic, technical and regulatory levels, 
span both the various steps of the value 
added process and national borders. In the 
end, expectations will be met only if all 
parties involved stay the course and act 
pragmatically as well as strategically. 
H2 and the debate in Germany 
The H2 value chain can cover very different 
production steps. The conversion of H2 into 
various synthetic fuels takes place in highly 
complex modules; these vary according to 
the form of energy and technology deployed, 
the physical states during transport (liquid 
or gaseous, pure or as admixture) and the 
means of transport. The final result is either 
pure H2 or – if combined with carbon diox-
ide (CO2) or nitrogen (N2) – synthetic fuels 
such as methane, methanol, Fischer-Tropsch 
products and ammonia. 
Owing to this range, H2 downstream 
products can be deployed throughout the 
energy system. Hydrogen can also be used 
as a storage medium and raw material. 
Today H2 produced from fossil fuels such 
as natural gas and coal is already being 
used at oil refineries and in the chemical 
industry. Since more than 70 per cent of 
Germany’s primary energy needs are cur-
rently being met by imports, there are good 
reasons to rely on international trade along-
side domestic production. 
Because Germany is aiming for climate-
neutral energy supplies, the focus of the 
German debate is green hydrogen. This is 
produced by electrolysis from renewable 
electricity, a process in which no green-
house gases are emitted. Other factors in its 
favour are that the cost of generating power 
from renewable sources has plummeted 
and surplus electricity obtained from wind 
and solar energy is periodically available. 
For this reason, there is much discussion 
in Germany about using H2 as a storage 
medium and feeding it into existing gas net-
works and/or converting some of those 
networks into H2 ones. However, according 
to various studies, the amount of green 
hydrogen produced in Germany will not 
suffice in a climate-neutral energy system 
to meet the demand for H2 and the syn-
thetic fuels produced from it. 
While the German debate is concentrated 
on green hydrogen, the colour spectrum is 
broader at the international level. At pres-
ent, the largest volumes are produced from 
coal and natural gas – this product is re-
ferred to as grey hydrogen – but the result-
ing CO2 is not captured and stored. There is 
particular focus on blue hydrogen, which 
is obtained from natural gas by means of 
steam reforming, whereby, in this case, the 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) process is 
used. Turquoise hydrogen is produced from 
natural gas by means of pyrolysis, and solid 
carbon is obtained as a by-product. Both 
processes yield comparatively low emis-
sions. There is also pink hydrogen, which 
is obtained from nuclear energy, and hydro-
gen produced from biomass. Finally, elec-
trolysers could simply run on a country’s 
power mix. In 2019 the cost of producing 
green and blue hydrogen was 360 per cent 
and 40 per cent higher, respectively, than 
that of producing grey hydrogen. 
The “Gas Dialogue Process 2030”, which 
was launched by the German government 
in December 2018 to clarify the role of 
gases in a decarbonizing energy economy, 
sent a clear signal: Molecules that are “CO2 
free or neutral” will continue to play an 
important role in the energy system in the 
long run. And H2 is seen as key, not least 
in those processes and end-use applications 
whose complete decarbonization is regarded 
as very complex technically and too expen-
sive. Accordingly, the 29 measures in the 
Action Plan of the National Hydrogen Strat-
egy range from production, applications, 
industry, heat, transport and infrastructure 
to research and education. 
Hydrogen and climate policy 
The discussion about the role of hydrogen – 
which is taking place in a similar form in 
many other OECD countries – is a result of 
more comprehensive climate action plans. 
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In accordance with the Paris climate agree-
ment, which provides for global net-zero 
greenhouse gas emissions to be achieved in 
the second half of the century, many gov-
ernments have adopted national zero-emis-
sion targets since 2016, including Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand. 
Meanwhile, both the EU and Germany have 
taken this route, too. Consequently, all 
branches of industry are under great pres-
sure to indicate how they intend to achieve 
net-zero emissions. 
Energy-intensive companies – for exam-
ple, in the steel industry – are already plan-
ning or operating the first H2 pilot plants. 
Their goal is to reduce emissions and 
eventually achieve climate-neutral produc-
tion. In order to incorporate these activities 
into a national climate strategy, they should 
be embedded in an overall concept for a 
climate-neutral energy system. In Germany, 
this is linked not only to the increased pro-
duction of renewable energy but also to 
infrastructure planning and the intercon-
necting of diverse economic sectors in the 
areas of energy use and production (sector 
coupling). Depending on whether hydrogen 
is used in a targeted manner or more widely 
in the industrial, transport or heating sec-
tor, there will be not only different emis-
sion reductions but also different dynamics 
for a market roll-out as well as, ultimately, 
different import scenarios. 
Until the adoption of the German Cli-
mate Protection Act in late 2019, there had 
been agreement on a reduction of at least 
80 per cent by 2050 and the policy focus had 
been much more on the electricity sector 
than on industry or long-distance transport. 
A clear trend can be recognized in energy 
system modelling: the smaller the scope for 
"residual emissions" in industry and trans-
port, the more important the coupling of sec-
tors and the use of hydrogen. However, Ger-
many will not be able to produce all of the 
climate-friendly hydrogen that will be re-
quired. And while studies have come up with 
different estimates, there is no doubt that im-
ports will be needed on a significant scale. 
The German government still has to adopt 
changes to the national Energy Industry Act 
and the Gas Network Access Regulation. It 
also has some leeway in promoting the pre-
ferred methods for the production of hydro-
gen or its application, which, in turn, will 
have an impact on imports. However, deci-
sions about new gas market rules and funda-
mental regulatory issues will have to be 
taken at the EU level: these include certifi-
cation systems and verification of origin/ 
emission intensity of hydrogen, quotas for 
synthetic fuels, adjustments in the EU Emis-
sions Trading System (EU ETS) and tech-
nology-specific changes in competition law. 
Furthermore, EU gas market regulation has 
to be adapted to take into account the de-
carbonization of gas, reduction of methane 
emissions and the introduction of H2 in a 
defined sequence and interlocking steps. 
Last but not least, hydrogen should become 
part of the EU’s integrated Ten-Year Net-
work Development Plans (TYNDP) for elec-
tricity and gas and the related scenarios. 
Hydrogen in the EU climate-
neutral energy system 
The Commission’s proposal on the Euro-
pean Green Deal did not discuss hydrogen, 
while its industrial strategy only touched 
upon the subject. The Commission’s pro-
posal for an EU recovery plan – yet to be 
negotiated with member states and the 
European Parliament – foresees financial 
and regulatory support for the creation of 
a climate-friendly hydrogen economy. The 
hydrogen strategy of the EU Commission 
will be released in July 2020. 
Cooperation within the EU would enable 
regional industrial clusters to quickly switch 
to hydrogen. This would pave the way for 
the gradual development and interlocking 
of the individual production modules and/ 
or imports, transport and storage, process-
ing and demand. If the EU were to draw up 
such roadmaps, it would also be necessary 
to provide a more detailed outline of how 
a market roll-out could be achieved. The 
regions along the borders of North Rhine-
Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Belgium and 
The Netherlands could be used for this pur-
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pose. Step by step, the chemical plants and 
refineries in these regions could be linked 
via a transport network connecting ports 
and wind parks by using (to some extent) 
already existing infrastructure – namely, 
pipelines and waterways. Last but not least, 
pipelines currently still used for transport-
ing low-calorific gas could be transformed 
and integrated into a hydrogen network. 
From an industrial policy perspective, 
the EU should not only promote the hydro-
gen chain in order to assume technology 
leadership in the Clean Hydrogen Alliance, 
on which the Commission has set its sights; 
it should also establish norms and stand-
ards. Above all, the emission intensity of 
individual processes will determine the role 
that hydrogen plays in climate policy with-
in the EU. For this reason, it is crucial that 
the EU rapidly introduces quality standards 
and H2 certification in order to ensure the 
acceptance of hydrogen both in Germany 
and throughout Europe. 
Certification is also important for inter-
national trade. It already exists for biofuels 
under the Renewable Energy Directive in 
combination with EU-wide minimum quo-
tas. Among other things, the revised version 
of the directive (RED II) provides for the 
share of renewable energies in transport to 
increase to 14 per cent by 2030. Germany 
plans to set a higher target when applying 
the directive at the national level. This 
paves the way for promoting, for example, 
the increased use of electricity-based syn-
thetic fuels and the use of green H2 at refin-
eries. However, the European Commission 
should first determine precisely what the 
life-cycle accounting rules are. 
The EU is facing other challenges in in-
ternational cooperation. For one thing, the 
foreign-trade activities of individual mem-
ber states with third countries need to be 
harmonized more closely (see below). At 
the same time, in order to ensure the com-
petitiveness of energy-intensive industries 
– which, in the long run, want to become 
climate neutral through the use of H2 – 
the EU has to find a way to reduce the cost 
of launching hydrogen-based production. 
Several options for achieving this exist, and 
they will matter when the European Green 
Deal is implemented. 
First, the legal framework for state aid 
should be designed in such a way that 
direct subsidies for hydrogen-based produc-
tion would be temporarily permissible. 
Second, the cost pressure for the investing 
company could be reduced if the EU ETS 
provided free carbon allowances for the 
investment. Third, a levy for imports (bor-
der carbon adjustment), which the Com-
mission is currently considering, could en-
sure that European goods produced “cleanly” 
would not be squeezed out of the market 
by products that were manufactured using 
emission-intensive processes and power 
sources. Fourth, a financing tool called 
“Carbon Contracts for Difference”, which is 
known from renewable energy project de-
velopment, can help to reduce the financial 
risks for hydrogen investors. It guarantees 
a minimum CO2price and thus establishes a 
long-term low-carbon investment incentive, 
while hedging against the hiking of CO2 
costs in the EU emission trading scheme. 
For the German government, it is essen-
tial to cooperate with the EU if the pilot 
projects are to lead to a market roll-out. 
Larger plants are needed to help ensure in-
creases in supply– currently, around 35 
power-to-gas installations are operating in 
Germany with a total combined capacity 
of around 30 MW. The Megawatt output 
of the individual installations remains in 
single digits, and the recently announced 
5 GW objective would mean an almost 
170fold increase within less than 10 years 
in Germany alone. In order to scale up 
demand, there should be concerted efforts 
to achieve an EU-wide critical mass that 
encourages investment. As clean hydrogen 
is likely to be an important part of the EU’s 
recovery plan, synergies should be used to 
finance the market roll-out. 
Interaction with pioneers 
A global and European gas market will not 
simply emerge. It requires joint efforts to 
kick-start demand and supply. In order to 
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prioritize, the following could serve as cri-
teria for the selection of partner countries: 
1) the current level of deployment of hydro-
gen technologies; 2) membership of a com-
mon regulatory and economic area; 3) exist-
ing infrastructure and cooperation at the 
company level; 4) the potential for and the 
existing deployment of renewable energies; 
and 5) existing energy partnerships and trade 
relations. A critical mass of supply and 
demand can be rapidly created only if the 
various value creation stages and modules 
are aligned with one another – in which 
case, a market for H2 and its downstream 
products can be developed step by step. 
In the Asia-Pacific region, the inter-
national pioneers include Australia and 
Japan. In summer 2020, the first shipload 
of liquefied hydrogen is planned to depart 
from down under to Japan. Owing to the 
vast size of its territory and its huge poten-
tial for renewable energies, Australia is re-
garded as a sleeping giant in a global green 
hydrogen economy. Moreover, with its 
terminals for liquefied natural gas exports, 
the country has the infrastructure and 
know-how to liquefy molecules and trans-
port the gas in liquid form. However, it 
currently produces hydrogen from coal. 
South Korea and California stand out as 
potential partners, too, owing to projects 
planned and targets announced. And an-
other promising partner is Chile on account 
of its enormous renewables and raw ma-
terials potential. While from a European 
perspective the transport routes are long, 
these countries are nonetheless important 
technology and trade partners not least 
because they are open to multilateral regu-
lations and agreements. In order to pro-
mote multilateral governance, it is impor-
tant to cooperate with those pioneers that 
are implementing actual projects. 
Cooperation with neighbours 
Norway and United Kingdom are the part-
ners of first choice for the EU. Norway is 
not only the most advanced in the develop-
ment of blue H2 technology; it is also an 
important supplier of oil, gas and electricity 
as well as part of the European Economic 
Area. Great Britain already has flagship 
projects and is a pioneer in conversion to 
local H2 networks. Green hydrogen, which 
is produced using offshore wind, could 
become the focus of cooperation between 
these neighbouring North Sea states. And 
the expertise of local wind generators and 
oil & gas companies could be used in the 
development of this production cluster. 
Two billion Euros are earmarked in the 
German National Hydrogen strategy for 
partnerships with countries where, owing 
to their geography, green hydrogen can be 
produced efficiently. Geographically and 
politically, the countries of the Mediter-
ranean region are potential partners, too, 
insofar as energy partnerships are already 
in place. They could become suppliers of 
green hydrogen as there is considerable 
potential for these countries to use wind 
and solar energy. Moreover, they would 
profit both from the installation of facilities 
and from export revenues. But it remains 
the case that the demand for renewable 
energy in the countries of origin must first 
be met. It is only in this way that climate 
change mitigation can be taken into account 
and a situation prevented whereby green 
hydrogen is exported while fossil fuels are 
used to ensure local power supplies. More-
over, the water-energy-food nexus is playing 
out in North Africa. Morocco will need huge 
renewable capacity to be installed and enor-
mous volumes of water in order to “green” 
its current ammonia production alone. 
To date, the discussion in Germany has 
tended not to focus on southern and south-
eastern Europe and Ukraine, all of which 
are integrated into the common energy 
market at the regulatory level and all of 
whose infrastructure networks and existing 
trade mechanisms could be used. In this 
respect, they are as well suited to take part 
in the Europe-wide development of green 
hydrogen as are the countries of the eastern 
Mediterranean and Turkey. Moreover, given 
the increased influence of Russia, China 
and the United States, it is of geostrategic 
importance that they maintain strong ties 
SWP Comment 32 
June 2020 
6 
with the EU. The Hydrogen Europe’s 2x40 
GW Green Hydrogen Initiative presents a road-
map to simultaneously roll-out hydrogen in 
the EU and the neighbourhood. 
Already existing cooperation at the 
company level is an important competitive 
and time-saving advantage. In this context, 
Russia is an interesting potential partner – 
one that offers many opportunities with re-
gard to the development of an international 
hydrogen economy. Indeed, the country 
could convert to H2 technology and become 
one of the largest producers worldwide. 
Not only would it be able to produce both 
blue and turquoise hydrogen from natural 
gas; it also has abundant wind potential, 
which could be used to produce green 
hydrogen. Furthermore, infrastructure for 
the transport of gas from Russia to the EU 
already exists. 
At the same time, the case of Russia 
shows that opinions currently diverge over 
where and at what stage of the value chain 
hydrogen should be produced. Right now, 
Gazprom continues to focus on the export 
of natural gas; as far as the Russian com-
pany is concerned, gas should be used for 
hydrogen production only when it reaches 
Germany. While this is the easiest way for 
Gazprom to keep its own business model in 
step with the times, there are also technical 
arguments in favour of its approach. Mean-
while, the Russian nuclear energy company 
Rosatom is already engaged in the produc-
tion of hydrogen. The example of Russia 
illustrates the thorny issues related to cer-
tification and the organization of produc-
tion networks and the individual stages of 
that process. However, political relations 
are currently strained: the EU as a whole 
should endorse cooperating with Russia on 
the decarbonization of gas and, above all, 
provide a credible regulatory framework 
that could remain in place long term. In 
this way, the EU would emphasize mutual 
interdependence and achieving a balance 
of interests in this area with Russia. 
Finally, it is also clear from the Russian 
case that the geopolitical consequences of a 
global hydrogen economy (see below) must 
be taken into account from the outset and 
that the energy diplomacy of Germany and 
the EU should be aligned accordingly. 
Shaping global cooperation 
Further international cooperation on the 
part of Germany and the EU is crucial to 
increase the supply of H2, on the one hand, 
and to achieve technological progress, on 
the other. Besides forming bilateral partner-
ships, it is important to strengthen pluri-
lateral and multilateral initiatives that would 
promote the hydrogen market, define the 
necessary standards and develop certifica-
tion schemes. 
The existing governance structures 
underscore the fact that hydrogen has been 
a niche technology so far. There is no one 
single body to address all H2-related issues: 
the platforms for dialogue, partnerships and 
research cooperation are the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the 
Clean Energy Ministerial and its hydrogen 
initiative (in which the EU is represented 
but not Germany). IEA and IRENA offer 
topical analyses on the subject of hydrogen. 
The relevant technical committee of the 
International Organization for Standardi-
zation (ISO/TC 197) establishes technical 
standards, while the Hydrogen Council, 
which comprises many leading global com-
panies, focuses on the commercialization 
and roll-out of industrial-scale solutions. 
Thus, the problem is not so much that 
there is an organizational void but that 
so far coherence and direction have been 
lacking. It is not necessary to create any 
new institutions. Rather, what is needed is 
to give more weight to the subject of hydro-
gen and, ideally, provide a clearer defini-
tion of the respective competences of the 
individual organizations. This requires co-
operation between first movers. 
The International Energy Forum (IEF) 
could be another venue for a dialogue 
about, for example, the switch from fossil 
fuels to H2 and synthetic fuels. The Energy 
Charter Treaty, meanwhile, could provide 
the opportunity to regulate trade, transport 
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and investment if the treaty modernization 
process proved successful and hydrogen were 
reincluded on the list of energy sources. Ger-
many and the EU could play a role in mak-
ing progress on both of these fronts. 
A hydrogen market can be physically de-
veloped via clusters with supply structures 
(hubs and spokes). In combination with 
cargo and shipping routes, it would be pos-
sible to establish the first hydrogen corri-
dors; and as a “captive market”, shipping 
(first and foremost the cruise industry) could 
be a key customer. This initiative could be 
promoted within the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO). At the same time, 
it is clear that trade in hydrogen will re-
quire harmonized approaches, standards 
and certificates for H2-based fuels and 
chemical products. 
Vertically integrated projects could serve 
to organize demand and supply internation-
ally across the individual value creation 
stages. At the same time, earlier contract 
models that have balanced emerging risks 
throughout the value chain could help in 
the market launch. Take, for example, the 
Groningen model for a long-term contract: 
the price was linked to that of a competing 
energy source and both minimum-purchase 
and payment obligations were stipulated. 
This allowed natural gas to be introduced 
into the energy mix in Continental Europe 
from 1962 onwards, to build the necessary 
infrastructure over time, to increase de-
mand and to diversify the suppliers. 
The geopolitics of hydrogen 
If hydrogen is to become a key component 
of a more climate-friendly energy system, it 
is strategically important for Germany and 
the EU to develop and maintain technology 
leadership. New networks, industrial link-
ages and trade relations result in winners 
and losers. At the same time, H2 and the 
fuels derived from it are substitutes for other 
energy carriers. But, above all, the geoeco-
nomics of hydrogen encourage competition 
and change the international division of 
labour. 
With regard to the market ramp-up, the 
most important competitor is the People’s 
Republic of China, which brings the sheer 
size of its market to bear. The country is 
already the largest producer of hydrogen 
derived from coal, and H2 is part of its “Made 
in China 2025” and “China Standards 2035” 
industrial strategy. Over the long term, 
China intends to develop its connectivity 
strategy around the hydrogen component, 
among others, and tailor the production 
clusters accordingly. As in the case of proj-
ects aimed at the use of concentrated solar 
power, China will pursue joint ventures 
to advance its technology and innovation 
leadership. Germany and the EU should 
create partnerships worldwide based on 
“Made in the EU” technologies. 
Among the obvious losers in the energy 
transformation are the oil and gas indus-
tries as well as those countries that have 
large oil and gas reserves. But they could 
become important players in developing 
the H2 value chain on the strength of their 
experience in handling and liquefying gases 
and through their offshore platforms. Thus, 
petrostates might be able to tap into new 
revenue sources, too. This is very important 
from the perspective of foreign and security 
policy in order to prevent the destabilization 
of individual countries and entire regions. 
But there is also good reason from a climate-
policy perspective to have Russia, Saudi 
Arabia & Co. on board for the energy system 
transformation. Offering these countries the 
prospect of being part of a climate-neutral 
energy system could yield a three-fold 
dividend: in climate policy, in boosting the 
potential of hydrogen and in foreign policy. 
Interestingly, the focus of the Desertec 
industrial initiative has shifted eastward to 
the Gulf, where the United Arab Emirates 
and Saudi Arabia are seeking pole position 
in developing a hydrogen value chain. Euro-
pean companies, meanwhile, have lost their 
key position in an important future-oriented 
project. It is, above all, China that is now 
combining infrastructure projects with a 
strategic industrial and foreign trade policy 
in its Belt and Road Initiative. The experi-
ence of the Desertec initiative offers lessons 
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to be learned: in the first phase, it is impor-
tant to get individual flagship projects up 
and running quickly using market-ready 
technologies. Moreover, there must be cau-
tious expectation management that is geared 
towards the long implementation phases. 
In a world of geoeconomic rivalries, it is 
necessary to take the industrial policy im-
plications into account. That is because the 
interests of many potential hydrogen pro-
ducers in deepening their own value chains 
conflict with the interests of those countries 
that want to import large amounts of car-
bon-neutral hydrogen for their own domes-
tic industries. Australia and Russia, for 
example, could export green steel instead 
of low-emission hydrogen. If that were to 
happen, Germany and the EU would have 
to weigh climate protection against indus-
trial policy. The debate about these conflict-
ing objectives has not yet even begun. 
Conclusion 
Currently, Germany and the EU have a 
technology base for H2 that spans the entire 
value chain. Germany, in particular, could 
use this favourable position to secure com-
petitive advantages and export opportuni-
ties. That is why both the industrial policy 
impact and the international competitive 
situation must be considered when drawing 
up the regulatory framework. Furthermore, 
the strategic significance of H2 technologies 
should be taken into account and the hydro-
gen industry protected against takeovers 
from third countries. 
A reliable and transparent EU framework 
is a prerequisite for both industry and poten-
tial partners. For this reason, it is of central 
importance to work towards establishing a 
level playing field not only in the EU but, 
above all, in the global context. Especially 
right now, when supply has to be increased 
and demand boosted, the dilemma of collec-
tive action arises at the various economic 
and political levels. 
First of all, it is crucial to expand the 
Clean Hydrogen Alliance at the EU level 
and to draw up a European roadmap for 
kick-starting a hydrogen economy. This 
would create a reliable framework for proj-
ects and allow larger pilot projects to be im-
plemented and the first hydrogen clusters 
and corridors established across Europe. 
But flexibility will be required to get con-
crete pilot projects up and running quickly 
at the international level and through the 
use of mature technologies. In what hap-
pens next, it will not be hydrogen colour 
theory that is decisive but reducing green-
house gas emissions in production and 
transport chains. The dilemma between 
working towards market roll-out and pur-
suing climate targets can be resolved 
in such a way that during the first stage, 
several types of production are approved 
and thereafter climate-neutral ones are 
sequentially prioritized and/or manufactur-
ing processes with higher emissions-inten-
sity are phased out. These different stages 
could be reflected in relevant certification 
schemes. From the perspective of industrial 
as well as foreign and security policy, such 
an adaptive model would be advantageous. 
The EU could then also include, on a tem-
porary basis, low-emissions hydrogen 
derived from natural gas by means of CCS 
and pyrolysis, or based on successively de-
carbonizing national power mixes. 
Last but not least, the Covid-19 crisis 
poses a challenge for the policy-driven trans-
formation of energy markets. If policy-
makers are not to lose sight of the long-
term goal of a globally decarbonized energy 
system, the development of a hydrogen 
economy is a key priority for recovery pro-
grammes. 
Dr Kirsten Westphal, Senior Associate in the Global Issues Division, heads the “Energy Transformation and Geopolitics” project. 
Dr Susanne Dröge is a Senior Fellow in the Global Issues Division. Dr Oliver Geden is head of the EU / Europe Division. 
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